



# Global and Local Epidemiology of Ebola Disease and Hantavirus infection




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**Centre for Health Protection**  
**Department of Health**  
**27 May 2026**


# Ebola disease



# The Zoonotic Spillover and Human Transmission Chain




# The Pathogen: *Orthoebolavirus* Taxonomy



Six species of *Orthoebolaviruses* have been identified to date, with three known to cause large outbreaks (Zaire, Sudan, BDBV). The current outbreak is driven by the **Bundibugyo virus (BDBV)**, which was first identified in Uganda in 2007. While licensed vaccines (e.g., Ervebo) and therapeutics exist for the Zaire species, BDBV currently has no approved medical countermeasures, making infection prevention and supportive care the only current lines of defence.

# Clinical Progression and Diagnostic Challenges




# Prevention & Control

- Avoid contact with fruit bats or primates and the consumption of bushmeat
- Safe and dignified burial of the deceased
- Ensure proper PPE for health workers
- Patients should be isolated in a designated treatment center for early care and to avoid transmission at home
- Identify and quarantine of people who have been in contact with infected persons for 21 days



# Previous Ebola disease outbreaks

- First occurred in 1976 – 2 simultaneous outbreaks in Africa
- Outbreak near Ebola River in DRC
- Largest outbreak recorded in West Africa 2014 – 2016: 11,325 fatalities
- Last Ebola disease outbreak in DRC in 2025:
  - 4 September 2025 – 1 December 2025
  - 64 cases (53 confirmed, 11 probable), 45 deaths (CFR 70%)
  - Affected six health areas in Bulape Health Zone, Kasai Province
- Last BVD outbreak in 2012:
  - 17 August 2012 – 26 November 2012
  - 59 cases (38 confirmed, 21 probable), 34 deaths (CFR 58%)
  - Affected Province Orientale of DRC



# The Detection Gap: Tracing the Virus's Unchecked Amplification

**24 April 2026:** Symptom onset in presumed index case (healthcare worker in Bunia).

**5 May 2026:** WHO alerted to an unknown, high-mortality illness.

**14/15 May 2026:** Laboratory confirmation of Bundibugyo virus.




## The 4-Week Blind Spot

The virus spread unchecked for nearly a month. Detection was severely delayed by:

- Masking from co-circulating illnesses (malaria, influenza-like illness).
- Critical breaches in Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) in healthcare settings.
- Community transmission exacerbated by unsafe burial practices.

# Geographic Expansion: High-Risk Zones



## Origin

Mongbwalu Health Zone (high-traffic mining area).

## Current Hotspots

Mongbwalu, Rwampara, and Bunia account for 96% of all suspected cases.

## Expansion

Outward spread across 15 health zones encompassing Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces.

# Latest Situation as of 24 May 2026

Data as of 24 May 2026




Affected countries	Suspected cases	Suspected deaths	CFR (%) suspected	Confirmed cases	Confirmed deaths	CFR (%) confirmed
Democratic Republic of the Congo#	906	223	25%	105	10	10%
Uganda	0	0	0	7	1	14%
<b>Total</b>	<b>906</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10%</b>

#Data source: Centre des opérations d'urgences de sante publique (COUSP-DRC)

# Severe Occupational Hazard: Healthcare Settings

## The Evacuated Surgeon



# 4

## Local Healthcare Worker Deaths

(Occurred within a 4-day span at Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital, indicating critical IPC protocol breaches).

# The Operational Reality: Accelerants of Spread

## Root Cause Tree



### Systemic Friction

Ongoing armed conflict in Ituri province severely restricts movement of Rapid Response Teams and secure transport of laboratory samples.

**Follow-up rate is currently only 21%.**



### Diagnostic Masking

A critical four-week detection gap occurred because early symptoms were heavily masked by co-circulating arboviruses and malaria.




### Community Dynamics

High population mobility, complex humanitarian crises (273,000 displaced in Ituri), and unsafe traditional burial practices compound the spread.

# Global Alarm: The Rationale Behind the WHO PHEIC Declaration

16/17 May 2026: WHO declares the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).



# WHO's Risk Assessment

**National  
risk at DRC  
very high**

Driven by a **complex humanitarian context**. Ongoing conflict in Ituri restricts surveillance teams and rapid response deployments. Contact tracing follow-up sits at a **critical 21%** due to insecurity.

**Regional  
risk high**

Significant risks from highly mobile displaced populations and porous land borders. Regional transit increases potential for spread beyond immediate areas.

**Global  
risk low**

WHO assesses the global public health risk as **low**. There is **no recommendation to close borders** or restrict international trade, as the geographical containment outside of immediate neighbouring nations remains strong.

# Ebola Virus Disease in Hong Kong SAR

- Viral haemorrhagic fever including Ebola virus disease is a statutory notifiable disease since July 2008
- Suspected or confirmed cases must be reported to the Centre for Health Protection for investigation
- No confirmed Ebola disease case in Hong Kong



# Hong Kong's Risk Profile: Evaluating Local Vulnerability



## Overall Risk to Hong Kong SAR: **LOW**

- ✓ **Geographic Distance**  
Negligible direct travel links. No direct flights between DRC/Uganda and Hong Kong; travel requires indirect transit (usually via Addis Ababa).
- ✓ **Ecological Shield**  
The natural reservoirs for Ebolaviruses (specific species of African fruit bats) are completely absent in Hong Kong. No local intermediate primate hosts exist.
- ✓ **Healthcare Readiness**  
Complete absence of local ecological reservoirs makes sustained wider local transmission highly unlikely, bolstered by world-class isolation infrastructure.

# Responses

**Risk assessment and preparedness and control measures**

# Activation of the Preparedness Plan

The HKSAR Government officially activated the Alert Response Level on 17 May 2026.

## **What this means:**

This is the baseline defensive posture, enacted when an outbreak exhibits geographic spread outside Hong Kong but poses no imminent risk of local transmission.

It immediately triggers enhanced border screening, public health education, and heightened clinical vigilance.



## OUTBOUND RISK

# Red Outbound Travel Alert

The DH assesses the risk of the virus spreading to other global regions as very high. A Red OTA is active for the DRC; citizens must avoid non-essential travel.


## INBOUND LOCAL RISK

# Alert Response Level Active

The immediate public health impact to Hong Kong is assessed **LOW**. There are no direct flights to affected zones, and Hong Kong has never recorded a local case of Ebola disease.

# First Line of Defence: Targeted Port Health Measures

Because there are no direct flights, Port Health focuses on major transit hubs connecting Africa to Hong Kong.



# Enhanced surveillance for early case detection

**Statutory Notification**  
EVD is a notifiable infectious disease. All doctors are mandated to immediately report suspected cases to the Centre for Health Protection (CHP).



## **Diagnostics**

The Public Health Laboratory Services Branch (PHLSB) is equipped with validated molecular diagnostics. Conventional PCR for Ebola viruses (including BDBV) is available, also specific real-time PCR for BDBV will be available soon.



## **Isolation Infrastructure**

Suspected patients face compulsory admission. The Hospital Authority Infectious Disease Centre (HAIDC) is on standby for strict isolation and clinical management.



## Critical Transport

Fire Services Department Outbreak Control and Response Team (OCRT) deployed. Ambulances equipped with high-efficiency negative pressure systems.



## Quarantine Readiness

Penny's Bay quarantine facilities inspected and on standby for immediate activation to safely house any close contacts.



## Clinical Vigilance

Direct letters issued to all private and public doctors enforcing a 'highly vigilant' status for febrile patients with a 21-day travel history to affected zones.

# Risk Communication and Community Engagement



## Travel Restrictions

A Red Outbound Travel Alert (OTA) was issued on 21 May 2026 for the DRC. Residents are strongly advised to avoid non-essential travel.



## Targeted Community Outreach

The Department of Health has engaged directly with NGOs serving the African community in Hong Kong, distributing health materials in key areas like Tsim Sha Tsui.



## Healthcare Alertness

Letters issued to all private and public medical practitioners, urging them to maintain a "high index of suspicion" and updating them on reporting criteria.

# Summary

- The immediate health impact of Ebola disease on the public health in Hong Kong is currently low
- Relevant departments are fully prepared, comprehensive prevention and control measures with established protocols will effectively prevent the spread of the virus in Hong Kong
- Continue to closely monitor the development of the Ebola disease outbreak, and adjust the prevention and control strategies as necessary




# Hantavirus infection




# Hantavirus

- Hantaviruses are zoonotic viruses that naturally infect rodents and are occasionally transmitted to humans.
- In the Americas, infection has been known to lead to hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS), a rapidly progressive condition affecting the lungs and heart
- In Europe and Asia hantaviruses have been known to cause haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS), which primarily affects the kidneys and blood vessels.




# Viral Family and Classification

- Each hantavirus is typically associated with a specific rodent reservoir species, and they have a narrow host specificity.
- Although many hantavirus species have been identified worldwide, only a limited number are known to cause human disease.
- Hantaviruses present in North, Central and South America are known to cause HCPS. The *Andes* virus is part of this family and is known to cause limited human-to-human transmission among close and prolonged contacts, primarily in Argentina and Chile.
- Hantaviruses found in Europe and Asia are known to cause haemorrhagic fever with HFRS. Human-to-human transmission has not been documented in this part of the world.



# Map of Old World and New World hantavirus genotypes



## OLD WORLD

## NEW WORLD

**Geography**

**Eurasia**  
(e.g., Puumala, Dobrava)

**The Americas**  
(e.g., Andes, Sin Nombre)

**Clinical  
Syndrome**

**HFRS (Haemorrhagic Fever  
with Renal Syndrome)**

**HCPS (Hantavirus  
Cardiopulmonary Syndrome)**

**Lethality**

**<1% to 12% Fatality**

**Up to 50% Fatality**

**Transmission**

**Zoonotic only**

**Zoonotic +  
Human-to-Human (ANDV)**

# Transmission

- Transmission through
  - Contact with contaminated urine, droppings or saliva of infected rodents
  - Rodent bites (less common)
- Activities that involve contact with rodents will increase exposure risk
- To date, human-to-human transmission has been documented only for *Andes virus* in the Americas and remains uncommon.
- When it occurs, transmission between people has been associated with close and prolonged contact, particularly among household members and appears most likely during the early phase of illness, when the virus is more transmissible.



# Clinical Features

- Symptoms may start to develop around 1 to 8 weeks after exposure.
- In HFRS, initial symptoms begin suddenly and include intense headache, back and abdominal pain, fever, chills, nausea, and blurred vision.
- In HCPS, early symptoms include fatigue, fever and muscle ache. The disease may progress rapidly to cough, shortness of breath, pulmonary oedema and shock. High case fatality rate of up to 40%.



**HCPS: Fatigue,  
Fever and muscle ache**



**HCPS: cough, SOB,  
Pulmonary oedema**




**HFRS: abdominal pain,  
fever, nausea**

# Global Epidemiology - Europe

- Latest data shows that, for 2023, 28 EU/EEA countries reported 1 885 cases of hantavirus infection (0.4 cases per 100 000 population).
- This marked the lowest rate recorded over the latest 5-year period. During this time, the overall notification rate fluctuated between 0.4 and 1.1 cases per 100 000 population.
- Two countries (Finland and Germany) accounted for 60.5% of all reported cases.
- Puumala virus (PUUV) was the most commonly identified pathogen, accounting for 1 132 (95.6%) of 1 184 cases with available information on the causative agent. Hantaan virus was identified in 32 cases and Dobrava (DOBV) in 20 cases.
- Both PUUV and DOBV are known to cause Haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome.


# Global Epidemiology - Europe

Figure 1. Distribution of hantavirus infection rates per 100 000 population by country, EU/EEA, 2023



The notification rate for Belgium was not calculated as the surveillance system changed so that it was no longer comprehensive.

Figure 3. Hantavirus infection cases by month, EU/EEA, 2023 and 2019–2022




Source: Country reports from Austria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg were not included as these countries did not report data for all months from 2017 to 2021.

# Global Epidemiology - Americas

- In the Americas, hantavirus infection cases are much rarer, with hundreds of cases reported each year across the continent.
- In 2025 as of epidemiological week 47, 8 countries in the Americas Region have reported confirmed cases of HCPS, with an aggregated total of 229 cases and 59 deaths, corresponding to a regional case fatality rate of 25.7%.
- The Region has a history where human-to-human transmission is suggested, mainly associated with the *Andes* virus. These events, described in previous outbreaks in Argentina (1996 and 2018) and Chile (1997, 2004, and 2014), have occurred in contexts of close and prolonged exposure

# Global Epidemiology - Americas





\*Note: No data is available for Canada for the year 2024 and 2025 and for the United States of America for the year 2021, 2022, and 2023.

# Global Epidemiology - China

- 7 sero/genotypes of hantaviruses have been identified in China. Of these, only Hantaan virus (HTNV) and Seoul virus (SEOV) can cause Haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome
- In 2007, inactivated vaccines against HNTV and SEOV were included in the national expanding immunization program in China
- After decades of implementing comprehensive prevention and control measures in China, the incidence of HFRS has decreased to a low level ( $<0.4/100,000$ )
- A total of 9 Provinces reported average annual incidence rates higher than the national average, including Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Liaoning, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Hubei.

# Global Epidemiology - China



# Hantavirus Disease in Hong Kong

- In Hong Kong, Hantavirus-positive rodents are widely distributed across the territory
- 40 sporadic cases were reported to the Department of Health from 1995 to June 2008
- Hantavirus infection has been made notifiable in Hong Kong since 14 July 2008 and a total of fourteen cases (12 local cases, 1 imported case and 1 undetermined case) were notified since then
- The last case recorded was in July 2024. Hong Kong has recorded no cases in 2025 and this year as of May 21, 2026 (0–2 cases/year over the past five years)
- No case of Andes virus are recorded in Hong Kong

# MV Hondius Hantavirus Outbreak 2026

## Outbreak Chronology: Andes Hantavirus (ANDV) Cluster on the MV Hondius

Key Dates



MV Hondius departs Ushuaia, Argentina with 114 passengers and 61 crew



**April 13-16**  
1 crew disembarks and 6 passengers embark at Tristan de Cunha

**April 21-24**  
32 passengers disembark (inc. Cases #1, #2 and #7) at Saint Helena



WHO notified of cluster of passengers with severe respiratory illness



**May 6**  
Medical doctors and public health experts board the ship




Official WHO report of 8 cases including 6 confirmed and 2 probable



MV Hondius ports at Canary Islands, Spain and disembarkation initiated




Individual Case Chronologies



### Travel path of the MV Hondius

**Name:** Hondius  
**Flag:** Netherlands  
**IMO:** 9818709  
**Manifest** 88 passengers, 59 crew  
(at departure)





**Case classification** ■ Confirmed ■ Probable ■ Inconclusive

\* *Date of sampling*

Data source: WHO | Generated: 2026-05-12

Department of Health

# TRANSMISSION PATHWAYS



## ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE

Zoonotic spillover. Dead-end host.



## HUMAN-TO-HUMAN

Rare. Requires close, prolonged contact.

# THE CLOSED-SETTING THREAT



## HIGH-RISK DEMOGRAPHICS

Older population (Average age 65) with higher comorbidity risks.



## PROLONGED PROXIMITY

Shared cabins and extended face-to-face interactions.



## ECOTOURISM EXPOSURE

Pre-boarding mainland excursions in **ANDV-endemic regions** (Argentina).



## HEALTHCARE ISOLATION

Remote ocean transit delays access to advanced ICU/ventilator care.

# CONTAINMENT PROTOCOLS




## ISOLATE

Single cabins for symptomatic individuals. Dedicated bathrooms.



## PROTECT

Routine masking outside quarters. Droplet precautions for medical staff.



## DISTANCE

Strict 1-2 metre physical distancing.



## SANITIZE

Frequent handwashing. Disinfect high-touch surfaces (virus inactivated by bleach/ethanol).

# Actions taken

- CHP have exchanged official communication with more than 30 IHR National Focal Points
  - Confirm that no Hong Kong residents were present on the MV Hondius or classified as close contacts
- Provided information on rodent control to relevant parties
- Strengthen environmental hygiene monitoring at all boundary control points
- Issued press release, letter to doctors and hospitals, social media posts





Thank You

